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INTRODUCTION
The members of the Organization of American States ("O.A.S.")
have been oblivious to reservations made to the conventions of the
Inter-American System of Protection and Promotion of Human
269
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Rights ("IASHR").' Yet, O.A.S. representatives frequently under-
score the importance of strengthening the IASHR. The question is
whether strengthening the system is feasible without considering the
issue of reservations. This Article anticipates a simple negative an-
swer: the strengthening of the IASHR is not possible without an in-
depth analysis of the reservation law and its practice.
The nature of regional organizations and the cooperative interplay
among their members explain why states do not take a position
against inconsistent reservations. The importance of cordial relations
and comity outweighs other considerations and leads states to avoid
the issue. Most states do not consider other states' reservations to be
a substantive issue and, consequently, do not oppose them, regardless
of how antithetical they may be to the fundamental human rights
protected by inter-American conventions. The of lack objection is
probably best explained by the dearth of palpable direct effects on
one country by another country's reservations. This is certainly the
case within the O.A.S., where cooperation prevails.
The ongoing debate within the O.A.S. about the IASHR ("Dia-
logue") 2 considers "universality"--understood as the general accep-
* Diplomat, Alternate Representative of Ecuador to the O.A.S. Affiliation for
identification purposes only. The opinions expressed are those of the author alone
and are not to be attributed to the Government of Ecuador.
1. The IASHR is comprised of the following instruments: American Conven-
tion on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" (Nov. 22, 1969) [hereinafter
American Convention]; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights "Protocol of San
Salvador" (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Protocol of El Salvador]; Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (June 8,
1990); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (Dec. 9, 1985);
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (June 9, 1994);
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence against Women "Convention of Bel~m do Parfi" (June 9, 1994) [herein-
after Convention of Bel~m do Pard]. See Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. L./V./I.4 rev.7 (Feb. 2,
2000) [hereinafter Basic Documents]. This document prepared by the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights includes all the relevant instruments of
the Human Rights System and may be consulted electronically at the following
Internet address: http://www.cidh.oas.org.
2. See Dialogue on the Inter-American System for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, Juridical and Political Comm., O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. G
CP/CAJP-1610/00 rev. 2 (Apr. 24, 2000) (report by the chair) (evaluating the rele-
vant instruments and institutions of the Inter-American System, discussing the
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tance of its conventions-central to the strengthening process.
Therefore, the link between universality and reservations may be the
way to induce a debate about the latter. For universal application to
be achievable-which is unlikely under the current circumstances-
the states would have to continue their silence on reservations in or-
der to facilitate the process of the remaining O.A.S. member coun-
tries of becoming parties to the main instruments of the IASHR.
However, the principal effect of reservations is to limit the extent of
particular rights or group of rights. A confrontation between univer-
sality and integrity within the Dialogue is likely to come out to the
detriment of integrity, because the Dialogue tends to underscore the
value of universality. The price of such a strong emphasis on univer-
sality may, paradoxically, weaken the IASHR. By being oblivious to
flagrant violations of international human rights law, a focus on uni-
versality contradicts the central purpose of the Dialogue: to improve
the promotion and protection of human rights in the hemisphere. The
absence of integrity implies, by definition, that human rights pro-
tected by some international conventions remain unprotected.
Since reservations are a reality in the current stage of international
law, I maintain that it is necessary to force a political decision, absent
so far in the Inter-American System, to address this problem and to
explore effective alternatives of control to limit its negative effects in
accordance with the evolution of international human rights law.'
Supervisory organs could play an important role in determining
whether a reservation is consistent with human rights treaties. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("Court") could be endowed
with an ex-officio competence to assess the consistency of reserva-
tions without prejudicing its inherent power to decide on the matter
strengthening and development of the Inter-American System and offering propos-
als to the General Assembly of the O.A.S.).
3. See id. at 4 (stating that "full ratification of or accession to inter-
American human rights instruments is essential for strengthening the system").
4. See id.
5. See Vienna Declaration & Programme of Action, World Conference on
Human Rights, para. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157,23 (1993) (welcoming the prog-
ress made in the codification of human rights instruments, urging the universal
ratification of human rights treaties, encouraging all States to accede to these inter-
national instruments and "to avoid, as far as possible, the resort to reservations")
[hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
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in the exercise of its adjudicatory jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") should exer-
cise its broad competence bestowed in the San Jose Pact to report in-
consistencies between reservations and the Pact.6
Most of the issues outlined above require a theoretical approach.
This Article assumes the knowledge of treaty law codified in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties.7 The normative contained
therein is applicable to the IASHR. Relatively recent developments,
especially new doctrine on reservations to human rights treaties, are
also useful to the analysis.
This piece is divided into three sections. Part I summarizes the tra-
ditional theory of reservations applicable to the System. Part II
shows the inconsistency of most reservations with the American
Convention on Human Rights and demonstrates the inadequacy of
the traditional theory to address the problem. Based on the two pre-
vious sections, Part III proposes a novel but achievable approach to
reservations to the IASHR regime.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this Part is to analyze the reservations regime of
the Inter-American System of Human Rights and, particularly, the
American Convention on Human Rights ("San Jose Pact"). As ex-
plained below, it requires a review of the treaty law codified in the
Vienna Convention, because the normative contained therein is di-
rectly applicable to the IASHR. Also, new theoretical efforts carried
out by international organizations' and academia'-though devoted
6. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 41, at 36-
37 (listing the functions and powers of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in promoting and defending human rights).
7. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969), entered into.force by
U.N. Doc. A/Conf 39/28 (1980) (identifying the fundamental role and importance
of treaties in international relations) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
8. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 23-48 (re-
affirming their goal to protect and promote human rights in the region, and to es-
tablish a framework of "personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the
essential rights of man").
9. See General Comment 24(52): General Comment on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to Covenant or the Optional
272 [16:269
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basically to analyzing either a general theory of reservations or the
United Nations treaties-should be taken into consideration. I con-
stantly consult those sources when analyzing the reservations theory
relevant to the IASHR, but my goal here is to simply cite these works
without analyzing them. I base my analysis on the vast body of ex-
isting literature, with the intention of applying it to the IASHR and
drawing analogies where appropriate.
A. BACKGROUND
England introduced a reservation to one of the 1899 Hague Con-
ventions, and the Netherlands (depositary of the Convention) deemed
it necessary to consult the other parties to determine whether they
accepted such a reservation before proceeding with the instrument's
deposit. Some years later, this practice was generalized within the
framework of the Society of Nations. The so-called "Society of Na-
tions rule" or "universal rule" was established. This rule made it im-
possible for a reserving state to become a party to the convention un-
til the reservation has the unanimous consent of the parties.
The turning point on this perspective came when the former Soviet
Union incorporated a reservation in its instrument of ratification to
the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide""-a fact about which Ecuador and Guatemala objected.
Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Co% enant,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C21 rev. I Add. 6 (1994), reprinted
in CHRISTINE CHINKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS As GEN-RAL NORMS \\D -\
STATE'S RIGHT TO OPT OUT. RESERVATIONS AND OBJCTIONS TO HL \IA\ RIGHTS
CONVENTIONS, at 185-92 (J.P. Gardener ed., British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 1997); see also Vienna Declaration. supra note 5 (suggesting
alternative frameworks for analyzing the general theory of reservations within the
human rights field).
10. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LA\ AND PRACTICE IOU, (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2000); LIESBETH LIJNZAAD. RESERVATIONS TO UN-FIL t.
RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); -ee
also FRANK HORN, Resenations and Interpretattve Declaratunas to Multihateral
Treaties, in 5 STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Swedish Inst. of Int'l Lawv, 1988);
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON. PROTECTING HL \1 AN RIGHTS IN THE
AMERICAS. CASES AND MATERIALS 468-82 (4th ed. 1995) (e\aluating harmful im-
pacts of reservations within the current framework and examining potential alter-
native schemes).
11. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 28 I.L.M. 763 (Dec. 9. 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Con-
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Pursuant to the Society of Nations rule, the Soviet Union would be
prevented from becoming a party to the Genocide Convention. Dif-
ferent positions as to the aforementioned practice emerged and the
United Nations General Assembly requested that the International
Court of Justice provide an advisory opinion related to objections to
the Genocide Convention. 2 The General Assembly also requested a
general opinion from the International Law Commission on the
whole issue of reservations to multilateral treaties. What is signifi-
cant for the purpose of this work is the fact that, for the first time, the
Soviet Union reservation raised the problem of reservations to hu-
man rights treaties. Since then, the International Law Commission
("ILC") has developed an extensive body of work on this subject. At
the risk of oversimplification, this paper notes that the traditional ap-
proach to reservations prevails in the ILC Rapporteur's perspective,
and the disinclination to grant different treatment to human rights
conventions is evident."
At the regional level, the issue was handled differently. In 1928,
the Sixth Inter-American Conference held in Havana, Cuba, ap-
proved the "Convention on Treaties.', 4 The Pan-American Union,
ancestor of the Organization of American States, adopted the so-
called "Rules of Procedure"'" with the exclusive aim to clarify the
Havana Convention regarding the role of the General Secretariat of
vention], reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 247-50 (Transnational Publishers,
1997) (confirming the intention to prevent genocide).
12. See Request for Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1950 I.C.J. 15, at 8-9 (Nov.
17).
13. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/470/Corrs. I & 2; see also U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/477/Add.1; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/491/Adds. 1-6 (including the analysis of
Mr. Alain Pellet, ILC's Special Rapporteur for the subject), cited in AUST, supra
note 10, at 123-24.
14. See Conferencia Internacional Americana 1889-1936, General Secretariat
of the Pan-American Conference, at 368-72 (1938) (establishing treaty practice
and procedure between Inter-American States).
15. See Internal Legal Memorandum (unpublished document on file with the
O.A.S. Department of International Law); see also Jose Maria Ruda, Los Efectos
Ju-idicos de Las Reservas a Los Tratados Multilaterales, in O.A.S. GENERAL
SECRETARIAT, ANUARIO JURiDICO INTERAMERICANO 1-67 (1983); Luis Herrera
Marcano, in O.A.S. GENERAL SECRETARIAT, XIII CURSO DE DERECIIO
INTERNACIONAL, at 61-71 (1987).
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the Union, as well as to consider the effect of reservations. The rele-
vant idea to keep in mind is that the regional regime did not preclude
a reserving state from becoming a party to a convention. The effect
of the consultation process was to discourage the reserving state from
insisting on its reservation in the face of widespread objections; in
such a case the reserving state retained its right to become a party to
the convention with respect to the non-objecting parties. The result
was that the treaties faced potentially diverse juridical effects within
the same framework. For instance, a treaty creating an international
organization would bring a dichotomy in the status of the organiza-
tion itself, because a reserving state would be considered a member
of the organization only with respect to some of the other members
depending on their acceptance of the reservation. In fact, this idea
was submitted to the conference that approved the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, as discussed herein." The so-called "Pan-
American or regional rule" was the subject of a number of studies.'
In 1973, the O.A.S. General Assembly approved the "Standards on
Reservations to the Inter-American Multilateral Treaties"'" and in
1987 adopted a resolution on "Standards on Reservations to the In-
ter-American Multilateral Treaties and Rules for the General Secre-
tariat as Depositary of Treaties."" This is the currently recognized
applicable regime for the IASHR. The first of the two General As-
sembly resolutions cited above is based on the Vienna Convention,
and the first six articles of the 1987 resolution-which refer precisely
to the core of the reservations regime-are nothing more than a
transposition of Articles 19 to 23 of the Vienna Convention."
The proliferation of multilateral treaties changed the scenario from
what had been basically bilateral relations between states-even in
16. See Actasy Docunzentos, in O.A.S. GENERAL SECRET.ARIAT, CUNF1-RENCIA
ESPECIALIZADA INTERAMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS HLUANOS 34, OEA.ser.
K/XVI/1.2 (Nov. 7-22, 1969) [hereinafter Acts and Docunewnts].
17. See generally Herrera Marcano, supra note 15. see also Ruda, supra note
15; HORN, supra note 10 (examining the impact of the so-called "Pan-American or
regional rule").
18. O.A.S. Gen. Assemb. Res. Doc., AG/RES. 102 (111-0 73) (Apr. 14, 1973).
19. O.A.S. Gen. Assemb. Res. Doc., AGRES. 888 (XVII-O87) (Nov. 14,
1977); O.A.S. Doc. OEA/AG/doc. 2146/87 (Oct. 14, 1987).
20. The articles referring to the rules for the General Secretariat are not apph-
cable to this work.
20011 275
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
the context of multilateral treaties-to a new reality of emerging in-
struments diverse in nature and content. The emergence of genuinely
multilateral non-reciprocal rights and duties demanded a different
approach to the study of treaty law in general and to the elaboration
of a particular reservations regime. The so-called "treaty-law"
changed the traditional idea of the "treaty-contract" that had previ-
ously governed relations among states.
When a state rejects some conventional obligations and the other
parties are able to do the same without denaturalizing the convention,
problems do not emerge. Moreover, this is customary in agreements
where the rights are reciprocal, as in so-called "treaty-contracts."
On the other side, when the idea is to create a normative body
in which all parties are bound by certain obligations based on a sense
of collective self-commitment to comply with the convention, a res-
ervation may not directly affect the other parties. However, this de-
feats the inherent principle of equality based on all parties having
identical rights and duties.
The aforementioned rationale is particularly relevant to human
rights treaties because the special nature of the rights addressed
therein requires consistent standards of protection to sustain the in-
tegrity of the system. Considering the sui generis character of human
rights treaties, the reservation topic takes on the utmost importance
and requires a particular approach, especially where the treaty has its
own supervisory body. This was not addressed under the Vienna
Convention, thus affecting the IASHR.2'
B. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
1. Definition and Ratione Temporis
The San Jose Pact was opened for signature on 22 November 1969
in San Jose, Costa Rica, after the completion of negotiations held
during the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights
21. See CHINKIN ET AL., supra note 9, at i-xxix (explaining the notion of Muta-
tis inutandis with respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
276 [ 16:269
AMERICAN CONW ENTION ON HL IW RIGtlTS
("Specialized Conference").:: With respect to reservations, the Con-
ference adopted Article 75, which reads:
This Convention shall be subject to reservations only in conformity with
the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on
May 23, 1969.-'
According to the records of the drafting process, this provision
was not easily adopted. The project submitted to the Conference
contained a provision that limited reservations only to specific arti-
cles in conflict with constitutional provisions of the reserving state '
That was considered extremely restrictive and prompted a suggestion
that reservations should be accepted not only when a norm of the
Convention was in conflict with constitutional provisions but also
when it conflicted with legal provisions of the reserving states. It was
noted, however, that previous agreement had been achieved regard-
ing the obligation of the states "to adopt, in accordance with their
constitutional processes and the provisions of th[e] Convention, such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
th[e] rights or freedoms [contained therein]."" An evident inconsis-
tency would have emerged between the two conventional disposi-
tions-the reservation clause and the obligation to adopt internal
measures in compliance with the Pact-if legal conflicts with the
Convention had been accepted as a reason to admit reservations.2"
This controversy led to the adoption of a general reference to the Vi-
enna Convention, which facilitated consensus and adoption of the
aforementioned Article 75 in the San Jose Pact. However, the for-
mula subsequently brought on some tribulations regarding the reser-
vations regime that continue to affect the System.
The Vienna Convention includes the following definition:
'[R]eservation' means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying. accepting, approving or acced-
22. See generally Acts and Documents, supra note 16 (reaffirming the goal of
the American States in protecting essential human rights).
23. See Basic Documents, supra note 1. at 75.
24. See generally Acts and Docunents, supra note 16.
25. See American Convention, in Basic Documents. supra note 1. art. 2, at 24.
26. See Acts and Documents, supra note 16. at 365-66, 379.
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ing to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect
of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State... .'
Two elements in this rule are particularly relevant to the San Jose
Pact. First, states must formulate reservations before the convention
becomes binding on the party in virtue of the deposit of the respec-
tive instrument of ratification or adherence." A reservation by a sig-
natory state does not have any legal effect if it is not reiterated at the
time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification because, accord-
ing to treaty law, "[i]f it is formulated when signing the treaty subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval, [the] reservation must be for-
mally confirmed by the reserving State when expressing its consent
to be bound by the treaty."2 9 In general, the reason to formulate res-
ervations when the covenant is not yet in force may be the will of the
reserving state to clarify its interpretation as to the reserved disposi-
tion. When a state signs an instrument, it discloses its bona fide re-
garding the obligations stated in the treaty and raises the presumption
of its temperament to comply with and be bound by the convention.
Therefore, without having an immediate legal effect, a reservation
may anticipate the extent to which the reserving state is going to ap-
ply the conventional obligations or what that state's position is on the
consistency with international law of the reserved provision. In short,
the signatory state may think that such disposition is contrary to in-
ternational law or irreconcilable with its national law. This may also
be a good occasion to anticipate the views of other states regarding
the reservation, the relevance of which is addressed below. States,
acceding to the convention, also should express their reservations, if
any, at the time of the deposit of the instrument of adherence."° The
27. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
28. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 74.1, at
46 (stating that "[t]his convention shall be open for signature and ratification by or
adherence of any member state of the Organization of American States").
29. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 23.2.
30. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 74.2, at
46. The language provides:
Ratification of or adherence to this Convention shall be made by the deposit
of an instrument of ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of
the Organization of American States. As soon as eleven states have deposited
their instruments of ratification or adherence, the Convention shall enter into
278 [ 16:269
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUM.IA' RIGHTS
second aspect of the Vienna Convention definition, which is relevant
to the San Jose Pact, concerns the legal effect of the reservation,
which relates to the object and purpose of the American Convention.
2. The Object and Puipose Rule
As noted above, a reservation modifies the legal effect of the re-
served provision and its applicability to the state. However, a reser-
vation should serve a valid purpose and maintain inalterable the na-
ture of the convention itself. The Vienna Convention, Part II, Section
2, Article 19, explicitly addresses this subject and provides a setting
to analyze the actual reservations made to the American Convention
on Human Rights.
Article 19 - Formulation of reservations
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to
a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not in-
clude the reservation in question, may be made; or
c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."
The American Convention does not prohibit reservations (19.a),
nor does it provide for specific ones (19.b). Therefore, only para-
graph (c) of the article cited above is applicable to the American
Convention. In its Advisory Opinion number 2 (OC-2182), the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stated that "Article 75 must be
deemed to permit States to ratify or adhere to the Convention with
whatever reservations they wish to make, provided only that such
reservations are 'not incompatible with the object and purpose' of the
force. With respect to any state that ratifies or adheres thereafter, the Conven-
tion shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratifi-
cation or adherence.
Id.
31. Vienna Convention, supra note 7. art. 19.
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Convention. 3 2 This coincides with the wording of Article 19.c of the
Vienna Convention. From this it may also be inferred that only Arti-
cle 19.c is relevant to the American Convention.
The Court has consistently referred to the so-called object and
purpose rule in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction.'" However,
the Inter-American Human Rights System is not a model in imple-
menting the object and purpose rule, as evidenced in the next section.
Actually, most of the actual reservations formulated to the American
Convention are incompatible, not just with the reservations regime of
the Convention itself, but they contradict essential rights protected by
the Convention. For the moment, it is sufficient to mention that the
object and purpose rule is central to the inter-American reservations
regime,14 and that the nexus between the American Convention and
the rule is found in its Article 27 (suspension of guarantees):
1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the in-
dependence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating
32. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the Anerican
Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), no. 2, para. 2 (Sept. 4, 1982) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion
OC-2/82]. This opinion was rendered upon request of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, which contested the O.A.S. Counsel's view that Barbados
and Mexico were not to be deemed as being states parties of the Convention, be-
cause their instruments of ratification and adherence contained reservations; ac-
cording to the former O.A.S. Counsel, a consultation period of one year was neces-
sary to give other member states a chance to oppose the reservations according to
Article 20.5 of the VCLT. Id.
33. See, e.g., Restriction to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), no. 3, paras. 59, 61 & 65 (Sept. 8, 1983) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion OC-3/83]; see also Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2)
and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 8, paras. 14 & 16 (Jan. 30, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Advisory Opinion OC-8/871 (illustrating the Courts' practice in referring to the
so-called "object and purpose" of the Convention when giving advisory opinions).
34. See, e.g., Protocol of El Salvador, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art.
20; see also Basic Documents, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture, art. 21, supra note 1; Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappear-
ance of Persons, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. XIX; Convention of Belkm
do Pard, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 18 (demonstrating that most of the
other instruments of the IASHR, with some variations, required that reservations
must be made to specific provisions and that the object and purpose of the Con-
vention should not be affected).
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from its obligations under the present Convention ....
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the fol-
lowing articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right
to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from
Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws). Article 12 (Free-
dom of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family). Ari-
cle 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20
(Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Govern-
ment), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such
rights.)
Article 27.2 lists the articles that may not be suspended even in
emergency cases. The Inter-American Court analyzed the provision
in its Advisory Opinion number 8 (OC-8/87)."' The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights submitted to the Court a question
with respect to the applicability of a writ of habeas corpus in an
emergency situation. The relevance to our study is the Court's opin-
ion "that all rights are to be guaranteed and enforced unless very spe-
cial circumstances justify the suspension of some, and that some
rights may never be suspended." '
The temporary character of the measures to be adopted pursuant to
Article 27 also should be underscored. The term "derogating' might
lead to an idea of permanence. To the contrary, however, the Court
interpreted the ratione temporis of the provision by explaining "'that
[only] in serious emergency situations it is lawful to temporarily sus-
pend certain rights and freedoms whose free exercise must, under
normal circumstances, be respected and guaranteed by the State.""
To summarize, Article 27 is clear as to the exceptionality and the
ratione temporis of the suspension of some guarantees, and particu-
larly clear in listing the articles containing rights that never can be
35. American Convention, in Basic Docunents, slra note 1, at 33.
36. See Advisory Opinion OC-8/87. supra note 33 (analyzing Article 27.2 and
7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights).
37. Id. para. 21.
38. The French, Portuguese and Spanish versions of the Amencan Convention
use terminology that can be translated as "measures suspending" instead of "meas-
ures derogating."
39. Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, supra note 33, para. 27.
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suspended. Those rights somehow encapsulate the rationale of the
object and purpose rule, without implying that other rights could be
subject to unlimited reservations. 4
3. The Right to Object to Reservations
It is necessary also to consider the relation of the American Con-
vention to Article 20 of the Vienna Convention (acceptance of and
objection to reservations), which reads as follows:
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any sub-
sequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so
provides ....
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the
treaty otherwise provides:
a) acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes
the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if
or when the treaty is in force for those States;
b) an objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting
and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely ex-
pressed by the objecting State;
c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other con-
tracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraph... 4 and unless the treaty otherwise
provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it
shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of
twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on
which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is
later.4 '
The Inter-American Court, in its controversial OC-2/82, stated that
40. See 1 Hernn Salgado, Las Reservas En Los Tratados de Derechos
Humanos, LIBER AMICORUM HECTOR Fix ZAMUDIO 1I (Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 1998).
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 20.
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only paragraph 1 of Article 20 is relevant to the Convention. " This
opinion contradicted a former O.A.S. Legal Counsel view that
deemed Articles 20.4 and 20.5 regarding reserving states to be appli-
cable. According to the latter, for the reserving state to be considered
a party to the Convention, it was necessary that the reservation be
accepted by at least one of the states parties (20.4.c) or for twelve
months to pass without objection (20.5). With regards to the Ameri-
can Convention, this perception seems to redeem, to some extent, the
traditional Pan-American Rule. The Court reasoned that human
rights treaties are different from traditional multilateral covenants
and affirmed that the acceptance by the other states parties of reser-
vations made to the treaties is not necessary for reserving states to
become parties to the Convention. The Court thus arrives at the con-
clusion that the American Convention "must be seen [as] a multilat-
eral legal instrument ... enabling States to make binding unilateral
commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals within
their jurisdiction."43 According to the Court ruling, it is irrelevant
whether the instrument of ratification or accession has reservations
for the purpose of the Convention becoming binding or the date of
entry into force. As the Court noted, this reasoning has the virtue of
permitting the protection of individuals from the moment of ratifica-
tion, taking into account the particular nature of the rights protected
by human rights treaties." It would serve no purpose to delay the
42. See Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, supra note 32, art. 27. It notes:
In the opinion of the Court, only paragraph I of Article 20 of the Vienna
Convention can be deemed to be relevant in applying Articles 74 and 75 of
the Convention. Paragraph 2 of Article 20 is inapplicable, inter alia, because
the object and purpose of the Convention is not the exchange of reciprocal
rights between a limited number of States, but the protection of the human
rights of all individual human beings within the Americas, irrespective of
their nationality. Moreover, the Convention is not the constituent instrument
of an international organization. Therefore, Article 20(3) is inapplicable.
Id.
43. Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, supra note 32, art. 33.
44. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisor Practice of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 21-23 (1985) (justifying the opinion in
the text); cf HORN, supra note 10, at 360-65 (maintaining that paragraphs four and
five of Article 20 of the VCLT are relevant to the American Convention because
the right to object to reservations is inherent in treaty law and because it is not pre-
cluded by the nature of human rights treaties).
2001] 283
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
right of protection provided for in the Convention. Without a doubt,
the paramount virtue of the Court's opinion is the recognition of the
specificity of human rights treaties.
However, there are elements other than the simple expeditious en-
try into force that the Court may have sacrificed in its plausible in-
tention to give conventional protection to as many persons as possi-
ble in the least possible time. Arguably, human rights treaties do not
bring with them some multilateral or bilateral interests.4 5 The Ameri-
can Convention includes provisions that certainly may affect bilateral
relations. This is noteworthy in respect to the competence of the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights to "receive and exam-
ine communications in which a State Party alleges that another State
Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in th[e]
Convention."4  Certainly this provision has the potential to raise
some bilateral interests. Also, when O.A.S. General Assembly reso-
lutions call for the ratification of the treaties of the System, a multi-
lateral interest in assuming similar rights and duties becomes clear.4 ,
States may have different reasons for promoting these resolutions,
but, undeniably, there is at least a collective perception that the Sys-
tem may be strengthened by these means. What purpose do resolu-
tions serve if states do not have the right to speak out about the
"unilateral commitments" of member states to not "violate the hu-
man rights of individuals within their jurisdiction"? Why do states
consider the human rights supervisory institutions' annual reports
presented to obtain, inter alia, reactions from the states as to the
content of the reports?
4 8
45. See HORN, supra note 10, at 362 (noting that "the idea that human rights
treaties are completely void of mutual or bilateral aspects is erroneous.").
46. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I, art. 45, para. I.
47. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs on the
Observations and Recommendations of the Member States Regarding the Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Explanatory Note, O.A.S.
Doc., OEA/ser. G. CP/doc. 3326/00 (May 24, 2000); see also Observations and
Recommendations on the Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission ol
Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. G.A. Res. 1660, OEA/ser. P. AG/RES 1660 (giving
examples of such assertions based on the Permanent Council's draft of Resolutions
on Human Rights to the General Assembly in June 2000).
48. See OAS CHARTER art. 54, para. f (describing one of the General Assem-
bly's powers as considering reports of other entities).
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Collective self-control is implicit in the international protection of
human rights. States have the right to opine on reservations to human
fights treaties affecting the System of which they are a part. Even if
Articles 20.4 and 20.5 of the Vienna Convention are not applicable
to the American Convention, the Court's opinion misrepresented the
states' right to object to reservations. Contrary to what the Court
stated, the obligations acquired by ratifying the San Jose Pact are not
mere "unilateral commitments." It is necessary to rethink the appli-
cability of the Vienna Convention and its impact on the IASHR,
while not dismissing the contingency of states objecting to reserva-
tions.
Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 also linked Article 75 of the American
Convention to Article 20.1 of the Vienna Convention and deduced
that reservations not contrary to the "object and purpose" of the
Convention are covered by Article 20.1.
The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 20( 1 ), in speaking
of "a reservation expressly authorized by a treaty," is not by its
terms limited to [a] specific reservation. A treaty may expressly
authorize one or more specific reservations or reservations in gen-
eral. If it does the latter, which is what the Court has concluded to be
true of the Convention, the resultant reservations, having been thus
expressly authorized, need not be treated differently from expressly
authorized specific reservations. The Court wishes to emphasize, in
this connection, that unlike Article 19(b), which refers to "special
reservations," Article 20(1) contains no such restrictive language,
and therefore permits the interpretation of Article 75 of the Conven-
tion adopted in this opinion.
The phrase "reservation expressly authorized" used by the Vienna
Convention, though, could not be broadened to the extent provided
for in the Court's advisory opinion. By definition, the terminology
"expressly authorized" is limited, and its enlargement constitutes a
clear contradiction. Moreover, other international jurisprudence is
more persuasive in clarifying the scope of Article 20.1 of the Vienna
Convention when concluding that it "covers only 'specifically
authorized reservations' and that, even in those cases, the right to
49. See Advisory Opinion OC-2/82. supra note 32, art. 36.
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object remains."0 Certainly, it is necessary to take into account the
different nature and specificity of human rights treaties, and precisely
because of that, the parties' right to opine should be preserved.
The approach mentioned above is consistent with the view that the
concept of reciprocity for bilateral and multilateral relations "loses
much of its relevance for the application and interpretation of human
rights instruments. '' "S It is not wise to ascribe all the traditional con-
cepts of treaty law to human rights instruments. The particular char-
acter of the latter makes it necessary to rethink those concepts and
construe them in favor of individuals. Certainly, Article 21 of the Vi-
enna Convention, which relates to the legal effect of reservations," is
not sound in human rights matters." The one year consultation pro-
50. See HORN, supra note 10, at 363 (citing the ad hoc Court of Arbitration
ruling in the Anglo French Continental Shelf).
[T]he Court considers the view expressed by both Parties that Article 12 can-
not be read as committing States to accept in advance any and every reserva-
tion to articles other than Articles 1, 2 and 3 to be clearly corrected. Such an
interpretation of Article 12 would amount almost to a license to contracting
States to write their own treaty and would manifestly go beyond the purpose
of the Article. Only if the Article had authorized the making of specific reser-
vations could parties to the Convention be understood as having accepted a
particular reservation in advance. But this is not the case with Article 12,
which authorizes the making of reservations to articles others than Article I to
3 in quite general terms. Article 12, as the practice of a number of States re-
corded in Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the Secretary-General Per-
forms Depositary Functions confirms, leaves contracting States free to react
in any way they think fit to a reservation made in conformity with its provi-
sions, including refusal to accept the reservation.
Id.
51. Buergenthal, supra note 44, at 23.
52. See id. (establishing the extent to which a reservation comes to modify the
relations among reserving, accepting and objecting States inter se within the scope
of international treaties).
53. See id. at 21-22.
Serious conceptual problems arise... when one attempts to apply these tra-
ditional rules to human rights treaties. What does reciprocity mean in this
context? Does it mean, for example that if state X makes a reservation to a
due process provision of the treaty, a national of state X, who was denied due
process by state Y, may not invoke that treaty clause against state Y because
the latter's acceptance of state X's reservation has modified the treaty as be-
tween them, and consequently for their national, to the extent of the reserva-
tion? To ask the question is to recognize that it is founded in a concept that is
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cedure, however, provided for in Article 20.5, and rejected by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, theoretically could serve the
purpose "of uncovering any possible opposition to a reservation and
providing a smooth way for the reserving state to abandon its reser-
vation when it faces strong condemnation" from its peers who are
parties to the Convention.4 This theoretical possibility may not be
discarded prima facie and deserves further analysis.
The role that the supervisory bodies may play in assessing incon-
sistent reservations should also be discussed. For instance, in the
European system, the Court has developed a system of control based
on analyzing the contentious cases under its jurisdiction." The Hu-
man Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights' General Comment No. 24 is even more remark-
able. 6 The core idea of the Comment is to attribute to the Committee
a role "in the objective assessment of whether a reservation is con-
trary to the object or purpose of the [Covenant]."' These experiences
may be applicable to the supervisory bodies of the IASHR, as ex-
plained in Section III below.
II. THE PRAXIS OF RESERVATIONS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
This Part analyzes the reservations to the American Convention on
Human Rights, in light of the applicable treaty law and new trends
with regard to reservations. The internal law of the reserving states is
only considered in relation to the provisions of the Convention. Con-
sidering the applicable international law and Article 75 of the San
Jose Pact," it seems that the most relevant stipulation of the Vienna
basic to traditional international law: that the rights of the individual under
international law derive from and are dependent on the rights of the state of
his nationality. It is equally obvious, of course. that this concept conflicts with
international human rights law and modem human rights treaties, whose pnn-
cipal objective is the protection of the individual against his own state.
Id.
54. See HORN, supra note 10, at 362.
55. See SALGADO, supra note 40. at 6-8.
56. See CHINKIN ET AL., supra note 9.
57. See Mary Robinson, Introduction, in CHINKIN LIT AL., stupra note 9, at xvii.
58. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 75 (cit-
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Convention is Article 19.c. ' "
Within that context, the analysis covers (1) the appropriate time to
formulate reservations (ratione temporis), and (2) the subject matter
of the reservations (ratione materiae).
A. RESERVATIONS RA TIONE TEMPORIS
The American Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 in
accordance with Article 74.2.'0 The Inter-American System of Hut-
man Rights follows the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as
to the time to make reservations." Uruguay was the first state to for-
mulate a reservation when it signed the Convention "2 with respect to
some political rights protected by Article 23.2. 3
As explained above, the reserving state generally may formulate
reservations before the instrument is in force so that it can clarify its
interpretation as to the reserved disposition. The state may think that
such disposition is (a) contrary to international law or (b) irreconcil-
able with its national law. This is important to bear in mind because
the signing of a convention raises the presumption of the signatory's
temperament to comply with and to be bound by the convention once
ing in Section 1 of the Theoretical Framework stating that "[tihis convention shall
be subject to the reservations only in conformity with the provisions of The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969").
59. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 19.
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is prohibited by
treaty; (b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not
include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not falling
under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.
Id.
60. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I, art. 74, para.
2 (explaining the procedure for ratifying the American Convention).
61. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 2, para. 1(d) (defining "a 'reser-
vation' [as a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State,
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty.").
62. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I (noting that
Uruguay made its reservations known on November 22, 1969).
63. See id. art. 23. para. 2 (enumerating the political rights available to citi-
zens).
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ratified. Therefore, without having an immediate practical effect, a
reservation may anticipate the extent to which the reserving state is
going to apply the conventional obligations or what its position is on
the consistency with international law of the reserved provision. The
latter seems to have been the reason for Uruguay's reservation,
which was reiterated at the time of ratification approximately fifteen
years after the signature.'
The other reserving States to the American Convention are Ar-
gentina,6 ' Barbados," Chile, Dominica[" El Salvador," Guatemala,"'
Mexico, 7' Trinidad and Tobago,~ and Venezuela. " According to the
American Convention and following the normative of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the reservations were made ei-
ther at the time of ratification or accession.
It should be noted that the only other convention of the System
that has been subject to reservations is the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture. Guatemala was the first state to
64. See American Convention, in Basic Documcnt.s, siqra note I Inoting that
Uruguay signed the Convention on March 26, 1985).
65. See id. (noting that Argentina signed the Convention on February 2. 1984,
and ratified, with reservations, on September 5, 1984).
66. See id. (noting that Barbados signed the Convention on November 22, 1969
and ratified, with reservations, on November 5. 1981).
67. See id. (noting that Chile signed the Convention on November 22, 1969 and
ratified, with reservations, on August 21. 1990).
68. See id. (noting that Dominica ratified, with reservations, the Conv ention on
June 3, 1993).
69. See Basic Documents, American Convention. supra note 1 (noting that El
Salvador signed the Convention on November 22, 1969 and ratified, with reserma-
tions, on June 23, 1978).
70. See id. (indicating that although Guatemala signed the Convention on No-
vember 22, 1969 and ratified with reservations, on May 25, 1978, it withdrew its
reservations on May 20, 1986).
71. See id. (stating that Mexico deposited the instrument of accession on March
24, 1981).
72. See id. (noting that Trinidad and Tobago deposited the instrument of acces-
sion on May 28, 1991).
73. See id. (noting that Venezuela signed the Convention on November 22,
1969, and ratified, with reservations, on August 9. 19771.
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formulate a reservation to that convention at the time of signature.74
Chile was the other state that formulated reservations to the Conven-
tion on Torture and its reservations were included in the instrument
of ratification.7" The ratione temporis in these situations is the same
presented above with regard to reservations to the American Con-
vention.
B. RESERVATIONS RATIONEMATERIAE
To consider reservations from the subject matter perspective im-
plies a necessary reference to the "object and purpose" of the treaty.
Also, one must consider that the framework of any human rights
analysis is the pro-homine nature of international human rights law.
There is an indissoluble nexus between the pro-homine nature and
the object and purpose principles, a nexus that should inform the ra-
tione materiae analysis of reservations.
The greatest difficulty that faces reservations to human rights
treaties is that human rights and fundamental freedoms are interre-
lated and should be considered as a whole. According to the Pream-
ble to the American Convention, and many other international in-
struments, these rights "are not derived from one's being a national
of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human person-
ality." This recognition obliges reservations to be consistent with
the object and purpose of human rights treaties, which are limited to
providing international juridical protection of rights inherent to indi-
viduals. This paper endorses this view because inherent human rights
pre-exist their recognition by the state.
However, because reservations are unavoidable, it might be useful
for a practical and methodological analysis to classify rights as dero-
74. See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, in Basic
Documents, supra note 1 (commenting that although Guatemala reserved its reser-
vation at the time of signature on October 27, 1987, and ratified, with reservations,
on December 10, 1986, it withdrew its reservation on October 1, 1990).
75. See id. (noting that although Chile also signed the Convention on Torture
on September 24, 1987, and ratified, with reservations, on September 30, 1988, it
withdrew its reservations formulated to Article 4 and to the final paragraph of Ar-
ticle 13 on August 21, 1990).
76. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I (quoting the
preamble of the Convention); see also AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS
AND DUTIES OF MAN (1948).
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gable or non-derogable, as in Article 27.2 of the American Conven-
tion. This facilitates the analysis of reservations to the covenants of
the System and allows the discussion to focus on how to limit their
negative effects.
1. The American Convention on Human Rights
Article 27 of the American Convention is consulted for the rea-
soning of this discussion. This provision may be used as the starting
point to analyze the reservations regime in the San Jose Pact. To that
effect, it is necessary to recall the rationale of the provision and to
determine whether it is an objective guideline for the analysis of the
existing reservations. As stated earlier, it appears that Article 27.2
lists the provisions that cannot be suspended even in an emergency.
The Court addressed this in its OC/8 and, as noted above, the possi-
bility exists of suspending some of the Convention's legally avail-
able rights. It was underscored above that such suspension is viable
only under exceptional circumstances. Keeping in mind this classifi-
cation of derogable and non-derogable rights from Article 27, I shall
now analyze the particular provisions of the Convention that have
been subject to reservations. For the purpose of this article, only
derogable rights are subject to reservations.
a. Right to Life
Article 4 of the Convention says:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be im-
posed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing
such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The ap-
plication of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it
does not presently apply.
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abol-
ished it.
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or
related common crimes.
77. See American Convention, in Basic Documents. supra note 1, art. 27.
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5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time
the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of
age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women.
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for am-
nesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all
cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
pending decision by the competent authority.""
The following countries have reservations to this article: Barbados
(4.2 and 4.5), Dominica (4.4), Guatemala (4.4),7" and Trinidad and
Tobago (4.5).80 Mexico formulated an Interpretative Declaration
(4.1).
One basic premise of the American Convention is that the right to
life is one of the fundamental rights to be protected by its provisions.
Article 4 stipulates the conventional obligation to protect life by law
and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." This fun-
damental principle does not require any explanation or elaboration.
The subsequent paragraphs consider the exceptional circumstances in
which the death penalty is compatible with the Convention, and set
forth the legal regime to its applicability within the limits of the
Convention. Hence, the right to life under the Convention may only
be limited by permissible death penalty. The Inter-American Court
has said that "[t]he text of the article as a whole reveals a clear ten-
dency to restrict the scope of this penalty both as far as its imposition
and its application are concerned." 8' This restrictive approach is to be
read in light of the first part of Article 4 (respect for life) and the
fundamental nature of the right in question. But no matter how im-
portant the safeguards against the imposition of the death penalty are,
its lawful application under the conventional parameters does not
preclude violation of the most essential human right.
78. Id. art. 4.
79. See id. (noting that Guatemala withdrew its reservation on May 20, 1986).
80. See id. (commenting that in May 1999, Trinidad and Tobago were no
longer parties to the American Convention because they denounced the Conven-
tion a year earlier on May 26, 1998).
81. Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, supra note 33, arts. 52-58 (explaining how the
Court links the death penalty legal regime to strict procedural guarantees, the seri-
ousness of the offense and intuito personae considerations, showing the intention
of the framers to progressively advance toward its abolishment).
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Even with this restrictive approach, however, there are no legal
barriers to keep the states from further restricting their conventional
obligations by means of reservations. Moreover, the highest tribunal
for human rights in the Americas has validated any state reservation
to the Convention in its partially disputable advisory opinion on
death penalty restrictions, rendered at the request of the Inter-
American Commission.2 The Court disregarded an argument claim-
ing that a reservation made to Article 4.4 also affects Article 4.2,
noting "that a state which has not made a reservation to paragraph 2
is bound by the prohibition not to apply the death penalty to new of-
fenses, be they political offenses, related common crimes or mere
common crimes." The Court went further and stated that "a reserva-
tion made to paragraph 2, but not to paragraph 4, would permit the
reserving State to punish new offenses with the death penalty in the
future provided, however, that the offenses in question are mere
common crimes not related to political offenses. " ' If a state is al-
lowed to modify its internal law to expand the death penalty after the
American Convention is already binding on it, and the reservation
that allows it to do so is not against the object and purpose rule, it
will be rather difficult to oppose any reservation in this respect. That
opinion loosens the restrictive approach to the death penalty, and the
regime set forth by the convention becomes much more flexible than
originally planned.
On the other hand, this flexible regime, contrasts with the rigid
interpretation that the "right [to life] shall be protected by law...
from the moment of conception."' (The different positions with re-
gard to abortion could be the subject of extensive debate that is out-
side the scope of this piece.)
It is relevant to discuss the Mexican interpretative declaration to
the rule in question. According to Mexico, the states would not be
obliged "to adopt, or keep in force, legislation to protect life 'from
the moment of conception"' because it "falls within the domain re-
served to the States."'85 This is a potential reservation because Mexico
82. See id.
83. Id. art. 70 (emphasis added).
84. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 4, par. 1.
85. Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, supra note 33, arts. 52-58.
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hypothetically could abolish a law punishing abortion under the um-
brella of its interpretative declaration. One could draw this conclu-
sion from the Court's third advisory opinion:
[A] reservation ... designed to enable a State to suspend any of the non-
derogable fundamental rights must be deemed to be incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention and, consequently, not permitted by
it. The situation would be different if the reservation sought merely to re-
strict certain aspects of a non-derogable right without depriving the right
as a whole of its basic purpose. Since the reservation referred to... does
not appear to be of a type that is designed to deny the right to life as such,
the Court concludes that to that extent it can be considered, in principle,
as not being incompatible with the object and purpose of the Conven-
86tion.
Pursuant to the language of this opinion, Mexico could make an
interpretative declaration that to eliminate a law punishing abortion
is not to be deemed as "designed to deny the right to life as such."87
However, a different interpretation is also possible according to
the same advisory opinion rendered by the Court:
The purpose of Article 4 of the Convention is to protect the right to life.
But this article, after proclaiming the objective in general terms in its first
paragraph, devotes the next five paragraphs to the application of the death
penalty. The text of the article as a whole reveals a clear tendency to re-
strict the scope of this penalty both as far as its imposition and its appli-
cation are concerned."
If restrictions to the right to life are set forth exclusively in Arti-
cles 4.2 to 4.6,9 one might infer that Article 4.1 does not permit any
restriction to that right.90 If so, the protection of life "from the mo-
ment of conception" would be an absolute principle that does not
86. See id. art. 61 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. See id. art. 52.
89. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, arts. 4.2-4.6
(specifying how member states may apply the death penalty).
90. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 4.1 (de-
claring that "[e]very person has the right to have his life respected").
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admit any limitation.9' But, the right to life established in Article 4.1,
as seen above, is not a categorical one. The problem here is not with
the concept of right to life but with the moment that it begins. Even
assuming that we were strictly talking about the right to life per se,
its protection, as seen here, is not absolute under the American Con-
vention, since it allows broad latitude for application of the death
penalty. It seems rather awkward, in such circumstances, to support
the idea of two totally different regimes within the same disposition:
an absolute one constituted by paragraph 4.1 and a flexible regime
with regard to the death penalty. Therefore, it is more likely that a
reservation to the phrase "from the moment of conception" would be
acceptable under the conventional regime.
The Court has not directly addressed the issue of reservations to
all paragraphs of Article 4 or specific reservations formulated for
each and every state, neither in the course of its adjudicatory com-
petence nor within its advisory jurisdiction. Our conclusion, how-
ever, from what has been seen, is that the Convention does not bar
reservations to Article 4.
b. Right to Humane Treatment
Article 5 of the Convention says:
1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral in-
tegrity respected.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.
4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segre-
gated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment
appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.
5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from
adults and brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so
that they may be treated in accordance with their status as minors.
6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essen-
91. See id.
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tial aim the reform and social re-adaptation of the prisoners.'
Dominica is the only state that has made a general reservation to
this article. The reservation alludes to "corporal punishment," which
is not prohibited under Dominican internal law.93 Dominica did not
specify to which of the six paragraphs of Article 5 it wanted to make
a reservation, as it did in its reservations to other articles. 94 In this
context, it is possible to elaborate at least three different interpreta-
tions.
First, the reservation may apply exclusively to paragraphs some-
how linked to the wording of the reservation in question. According
to the reservation, "corporal punishment" is not prohibited by Do-
minican law and therefore, the reservation may be prima facie related
to the protection of physical integrity mentioned in Article 5.1. 9'
Furthermore, this interpretation eliminates any possible nexus be-
tween corporal punishment imposed according to Dominican law and
the eventual violation of the moral and mental rights provided for in
the same paragraph.96 The reservation also protects Dominica from
the possible interpretation that corporal punishment applied under its
internal law constitutes "degrading punishment" according to Article5.2. 97
The second interpretation is that the reservation considers the arti-
cle as a whole and therefore all the paragraphs, where applicable, are
92. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 5.
93. The pertinent part of the reservation refers to "[C]orporal punishment ad-
ministered in accordance with the Corporal Punishment Act of Dominica or the
Juvenile Offenders Punishment Act." See Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 62-63.
94. See id. (documenting Dominica's reservations to Articles 4.4, 8.2.e, 21.2,
and 27.1).
95. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 5 (stating
that, "Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected.").
96. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has extensive jurisprudence
referred to the rights protected under Article 5.1. See Velasquez Rodriguez case,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 4/paras. 155-56 (1988); see also Godinez Cruz
case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 5, paras. 163-64 (1989); Neria Alegria
and Others case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 20, para. 86 (1995); Loayza
Tamayo case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 33, par. 57 (1997).
97. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 5.2.
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covered by it. Certainly, this interpretation is possible as it applies to
Articles 5.1 and 5.2. From a practical perspective, however, this par-
ticular reservation is not likely to apply to paragraphs 5.3 through
5.6.98 Interpreting the reservation as if it includes the whole article
completely bars any possible violation of the "Right to Humane
Treatment," by the mere application of Dominican internal law re-
ferred to in the reservation.**
A third interpretation is that the reservation has no effect since it
does not specify the particular paragraph to which it is supposed to
be applied. Had Dominica formulated a general reservation to protect
its right to apply its internal law with respect to corporal punishment,
this might be a good argument to contest the validity of the reserva-
tion. However, since Dominica did specify an article of the Conven-
tion, and did refer in the reservation to the conflict with its internal
law, this position per se is not a sound one.
Turning to a brief analysis of derogable vs. non-derogable rights,
Article 27.2 includes the right to humane treatment provided for in
Article 5 as one of those that cannot be suspended under any circum-
stances.'00 The broad scope of what is to be considered humane
treatment justifies this special protection, crimes against humanity
such as forced disappearances of persons or arbitrary detention are
violations of the right to humane treatment.""
As for the reservation made by Dominica regarding corporal pun-
ishment imposed pursuant to its laws, I find no reason to exclude
such situations from the list in Article 27.2."'2 This assertion does not
require extensive elaboration. Any action detrimental to the inherent
right of individuals to humane treatment-no matter how legal it
98. See id. arts. 5.3-5.6 (setting conditions for humane treatment that are not
directly related to corporal punishment). Argentina, for instance, has an "Interpre-
tative Statement" to this paragraph, saying that it "shall be interpreted to mean that
a punishment shall not be applied to any person other than the criminal, that is, that
there shall not be vicarious criminal punishment." See Basic Documents, supra
note 1, at 51.
99. See OC-8/87, supra note 32, para. 12.
100. See Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, siqra note 33, para. 12
101. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (guaranteeing respect for per-
sonal integrity).
102. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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may be under internal law-violates international human rights law.
No argument is reasonable enough to justify corporal punishment,
considering the object and purpose of the rule.
The IASHR, however, has a silent record with respect to invalid
reservations. It is true that any human rights treaty has the underlying
presumption that inherent human rights are not to be restricted, but
the American Convention is very flexible on the matter. Actually, the
practice within the System does not provide much leeway for ques-
tioning the validity of the reservation in question. The scenario is
even worse if we rely on what has been said by the highest tribunal
competent to interpret the rights and duties under the treaty. It is
enough to recall the words of the third advisory opinion that ". . . if
[a] reservation sought merely to restrict certain aspects of a non-
derogable right without depriving the right as a whole of its basic
purpose,"' 3 it would not be incompatible "with the object and pur-
pose of the Convention."' In this light, it might be argued that the
corporal punishment of Dominican internal law "merely restricts" the
right to humane treatment. If the reservation formulated by Dominica
to Article 5 of the American Convention were subjected to specific
analysis based on the experience of the IASHR regarding reserva-
tions, the most likely conclusion would be that it is not contrary to
the object and purpose rule.
c. Right to a Fair Trial
The relevant part of Article 8 says:
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be pre-
sumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law.
During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the
following minimum guarantees:
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a transla-
tor or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the lan-
guage of the tribunal or court;
b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against
him;
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
103. See Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, supra note 33, para. 61; see also supra
note 85 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be as-
sisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate
freely and privately with his counsel;
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state,
paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not de-
fend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time
period established by law;
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court
and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other per-
sons who may throw light on the facts;
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to
plead guilty; and
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
Venezuela introduced a reservation to Article 8.1 explaining that
its internal law provides for in absentia trials for offenses against the
res publica, a possibility that is not mentioned in the conventional
provision.' °1 Barbados0 7 and Dominica"" have reservations to Article
8.2.e. Whereas the Barbadian reservation explains that the right con-
tained therein is limited to certain crimes ("such as homicide and
rape"), '09 the Dominican reservation simply rejects the application of
this paragraph.
The first paragraph of Article 8 establishes the general principle of
fair trials and enumerates proceedings of various natures."" But it is
apparent that Article 8 emphasizes guarantees of due process in
criminal proceedings, which are developed in detail in the rest of the
article."' The fair trial is protected with special care in such cases,
and the rationale for that is the particularly precious nature of the
rights that may be affected by an undue criminal process. This is the
reason that the Convention establishes minimum guarantees for
criminal proceedings.
105. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 8.2.
106. See Basic Documents, supra note 1. at 57-58.
107. See id. at 52.
108. See id. at 62-63.
109. See id. at 52.
110. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 8.1.
111. See id. art. 8.2-8.5.
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In this light, the Venezuelan reservation does not deny the right to
a fair trial per se. It explicitly recognizes that, even in cases applica-
ble to the reservation (in absentia trials) the judicial guarantees and
due process should prevail. The reservation is not an exception to the
judicial guarantees but to the general rule regarding notification of
criminal charges and presence of the defendant during the judicial
process. As stated by the Court, "Article 8... contain[s] ... the pro-
cedural requirements that should be observed in order to be able to
speak of effective and appropriate judicial guarantees under the Con-
vention,""' 2 which the defendant may exercise by appearing at the
trial. In fact, there is nothing in Article 8 to be construed as barring in
absentia trials since the guarantee of a fair trial remains intact
whether the defendant appears before the competent court or tribunal
to claim his or her rights. In contrast, reservations that restrict the
procedural requirements mentioned in Article 8 potentially affect the
fair trial guarantee and are to be considered inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention. Such is the case with the Bar-
badian and Dominican reservations to Article 8.2.
Article 8.2 lists substantial procedures meant to assure due process
in criminal cases."' It is necessary to underscore the words used in
the Convention to assure certain minimum conditions for the admini-
stration of justice in criminal proceedings. "By labeling these guar-
antees as minimum guarantees,"' 14 the Court has stated, "the Con-
vention assumes that other, additional guarantees may be necessary
in specific circumstances to ensure a fair hearing.""' It is indisput-
able, however, that the guarantees listed in Article 8.2 may not be re-
duced or restricted by any means."'
112. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judicial Guarantees in States of
Emergency, Advisory Opinion No. OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987, ser. A, No. 9, para. 27
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-9/87].
113. See supra note 105.
114. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Exception to the Exhaustion of
Domestic Remedies, Advisory Opinion OC-I 1/90 of Aug. 10, 1990, ser. A, No.
11, para. 24 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC- 11/90].
115. Id.
116. See Castillo Paez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 34, paras. 75-79
(1997); see also Suarez Rosero case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. OEA/ser. C/No. 35, paras.
79-83 (1997); Advisory Opinion OC-1 1/90, supra note 114, paras. 25-29.
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Article 8 is not an inherent individual right per se, but includes the
principles to achieve the effective protection of fundamental free-
doms and human rights. In that sense, we should recall that Article
27.2, after enumerating the rights that may not be suspended under
any circumstances, ends with the idea that "judicial guarantees es-
sential for the protection of such rights" should also not be sus-
pended.'17 It is illustrative to look at the interpretation of the Court on
the matter of judicial guarantees. Considering the importance of judi-
cial guarantees in emergency situations, the Court concluded that the
judicial guarantees mentioned in Article 27.2 "are those to which the
Convention expressly refers in Articles 7(6) and 25(1), considered
within the framework and the principles of Article 8
The reservations that Venezuela formulated to Article 8.2.e refer
specifically to the right of legal assistance."' According to Article
8.2.e, the defendant has the option to choose his or her legal counsel,
carry out his or her own legal defense when permitted by law, and to
"be assisted by counsel provided by the state." ':" The Convention
also stipulates that this is an "inalienable right."' 2 ' Therefore, even in
the hypothetical situation in which a defendant refused legal assis-
tance, the Convention is clear as to the duty of the state to fulfill this
obligation and assure an appropriate legal defense. The guarantee
established thereby has the special value of preventing potential
cases of discrimination. It is not difficult to imagine situations in-
volving indigent defendants unable to obtain legal counsel. Consid-
ering the fundamental human rights that usually are at stake in crimi-
nal proceedings, justice may not be served in such situations if the
state does not provide the necessary support for an appropriate de-
fense.
117. See American Convention, in Basic Docunients. supjra note 1, art. 27.2.
118. Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, supra note 112. para. 38; see also Loayza
Tamayo case, supra note 95, para. 50. Article 7.6 refers to the right to judicial re-
course to determine the lawfulness of a detention, and Article 25.1 establishes in
general the right to judicial recourse for the protection of the fundamental rights of
individuals. See American Convention, in Basic Documnents. supra note 1, arts. 7.6,
25.1.
119. See Basic Documents, supra note 1. at 57-58 (documenting Venezuela's
reservations to the American Convention at ratification).
120. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 8.2.e.
121. Id.
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Focusing on paragraph 8.2.e, it is interesting to note the Court's
analysis, made in the context of the exhaustion of legal remedies. In
its Advisory Opinion No. 11, the Court emphasized the importance
of legal counsel in criminal proceedings and affirmed that "a viola-
tion of Article 8 of the Convention could be said to exist if it can be
proved that the lack of legal counsel affected the right to a fair hear-
ing to which [the defendant is] entitled under that Article."'22 As for
the consideration of particular violations to this paragraph, the Court
also stated that:
[i]t is important to note.., that the circumstances of a particular case or
proceeding-its significance, its legal character, and its context in a par-
ticular legal system-are among the factors that bear on the determination
of whether legal representation is or is not necessary for a fair hearing."'
In fact, in the exercise of its adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Court
has emphasized the importance of appropriate legal assistance.' 
2 4
One may, therefore, conclude that Barbados and Dominica could
not use the reservation formulated to Article 8.2.e as an exception to
their obligation to provide the necessary means for appropriate legal
assistance in criminal cases where such legal representation is neces-
sary to guarantee a fair trial.
d. Right to Participate in Government
Article 23.2 of the American Convention reads as follows:
The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred
to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, resi-
dence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a
competent court in criminal proceedings.'2
122. Advisory Opinion OC-I 1/90, supra note 114, para. 27.
123. Id. para. 28.
124. See Suarez Rosero case, supra note 116, para. 83 (stating that "[E]l sefior
Rosero no tuvo posibilidad de ... contar con el patrocinio letrado de un defensor
publico y, una vez que pudo obtener un abogado de su elecci6n, no tuvo
posibilidad de comunicarse en forma libre y privada con el. Por ende, la Corte
considera que el Ecuador violo el articulo 8.2.c, 8.2.d y 8.2.e de la Convenci6n
Americana").
125. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I, art. 23.2.
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Uruguay formulated a reservation to the Article and explained that
its constitution provides for suspension of citizenship if a person is
"under indictment on a criminal charge which may result in a peni-
tentiary sentence., 12' The concept of citizenship may differ from one
country's legislation to another but, for different reasons, it is con-
ceivable that some political rights that go with citizenship may be
suspended while an individual is serving a term in prison or even just
in prison under indictment. One may assume that there are situations
that bring either a de facto suspension of particular rights when prac-
tical reasons so require or a de jure suspension related to the civil ca-
pacity that the indictment involves. It is not clear under the Uru-
guayan reservation, however, to what extent some non-derogable
rights and principles such as the presumption of innocence may be
affected. The encroachment on non-derogable rights would deprive
the individual of the legitimate exercise of his or her right to access
public services as provided by Article 23.l.c."" After all, the lan-
guage of Article 23.2 is categorical as to the scope with which the
law may regulate the exercise of the rights protected by Article
23.1.c. This provision, read together with Article 27.2, leads to the
conclusion that it is not permissible to broaden the scope of restric-
tions set down in Article 23.2. Without prejudice to the above argu-
ment, since the reservation is very specific and related to a constitu-
tional provision, it may well be considered as fulfilling the standards
set forth by the Convention's framers.
Mexico also expressed a reservation to Article 23.2 with regard to
the political rights of ministers of certain denominations whom are
not allowed to vote or to associate for political purposes. :' There is
no apparent reason-other than internal law, of course-to justify the
reservation in question. The arguments presented above about the
non-derogable rights included in Article 27.2 of the Convention, and
the categorical language of Article 23.2, demonstrate the inconsis-
tency of reservations to non-derogable rights.
It may be helpful to point out a nexus between this reservation and
126. Basic Documents, supra note 1. at 51, 57.
127. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 23.1 .c
(guaranteeing every citizen equal access to public services).
128. See Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 56.
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the interpretative declaration made by Mexico to another of the so-
called non-derogable rights contained in Article 12.3,12" which con-
cerns freedom of conscience and religion. The interpretation seeks to
reconcile this fundamental freedom with the Mexican internal law
mandating that "all public acts of religious worship must be per-
formed inside places of public worship."'"" There is no jurisprudence
in the IASHR in this regard, but it seems too comprehensive to con-
fine public worship to specific venues, and it is potentially discrimi-
natory to those who may need places others than shrines or temples
to exercise their right to worship. It is also not clear how public wor-
ship, in general, may affect the rights and freedoms of others.
Moreover, when one reads the aforementioned disposition in con-
junction with Article 13 relating to freedom of thought and expres-
sion-especially paragraph 1, which recognizes that this "right in-
cludes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of
all kinds"' 3 -the Mexican interpretative declaration becomes ques-
tionable.'32
Reading the Mexican interpretative declaration to Article 12.3 to-
gether with its reservation to Article 23.2-in light of Articles 12, 13,
23 and 27 of the Convention-highlights the discriminatory charac-
ter of the reservation and, consequently, its incompatibility with the
object and purpose of the American Convention.
e. Other Reservations
Reservations to the American Convention contain many types of
flaws ranging from their incompatibility with the object and purpose
129. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 12.3.
"Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limita-
tions prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals, or the rights or freedoms of others." Id.
130. Basic Documents, supra note 1, at 56.
13 1. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 13.
132. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Compulsory Membership in
an Association Prescribed by Law for Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion
No. OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985, ser. A, No. 5 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-
5/85] (providing an extensive discussion of the inter-American philosophy on free-
dom of thought and expression); see also Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction, Advisory Opinion No. OC-7/86
of Aug. 29, 1986, ser. A, No. 7 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-7/86].
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of the treaty'33 to a vagueness of meaning that render them inapplica-
ble.'4 In this context, it is illustrative to mention the following reser-
vation formulated by El Salvador in its instrument of ratification:
"[S]uch ratification is understood without prejudice to those provi-
sions of the Convention that might be in conflict with express pre-
cepts of the Political Constitution of the Republic.""
This is a potential reservation to any provision of the Convention
and certainly may be deemed as inconsistent not just with the object
and purpose of the American Convention but with international law
in general. A reservation formulated to avoid contradiction between
the treaty and a constitutional provision of a party to it is undeniably
indisputable.'36 However, from the formal point of view, reservations
are supposed to be made no later than at the time of ratification or
adherence. Under the Salvadorian phraseology in question, any fu-
ture restriction to the conventional dispositions may be done by
means of constitutional reform. It is also a way to condition, at least
to some extent, compliance of the international obligations set forth
in the Convention, not just on the constitutional provisions in force at
the time of the reservation, but on possible future amendments to the
constitution. If the Court deems this kind of reservation valid, it may
constitute a substantive defect that exempts any further speculation
about the number of possible ratione materiae violations that may
arise.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A NEW APPROACH
The efforts, if any, to prevent inconsistent reservations to the
American Convention on Human Rights have been insufficient. Most
of the reservations to the Convention are far from being acceptable
by the standards of any traditional multilateral instrument, even out-
133. See, e.g., Basic Documents, American Convention. supra note 1, art. 27.2
(listing the rights that are not subject to reservations).
134. The Dominican reservation to Article 27.1 is illustrative: "This must also
be read in the light of our Constitution and is not to be deemed to extend or limit
the rights declared by the Constitution." See Basic Docunents,. supra note 1, at 63.
135. Id. at 54.
136. See AUST, supra note 10, at 120-21 (noting that different views to the so-
called "constitutional reservations" continue to generate controversy, and there is
not a single approach to the issue).
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side the field of human rights. Multilateral instruments are informed
by a mutuality of interests. This is of particular relevance in interna-
tional human rights law, where reservations should be extremely
limited. Therefore, the importance given to universality in the
IASHR cannot be compared to the greater interest of international
protection for human rights. Contrary to prevalent criteria in the
Dialogue, 37 the standards of inter-American human rights protection
are flexible enough to accommodate both universality and integrity.
However, when that balance is not possible in cases of fundamental
human rights, integrity should prevail. The issue deserves attention
because of the specificity of human rights treaties and their core im-
portance in disseminating consistent standards of protection among
their parties. Reservations should be framed in that context.
States' parties are the primary guarantors of the Pact's obligations
regarding reservations. The so-called "collective guarantee" should
be exercised to ensure that reservations to the American Convention
are consistent with the spirit of Article 75 and consequently follow
the object and purpose rule.' 38 But states are politically motivated,
and the cost of objecting to reservations could be greater than the
gain, specifically individual political gains or losses not directly re-
lated to the System itself. States' interests in international relations
are diverse and sometimes circumstantial, a fact that may have a pro-
found effect on some important issues.
The specialization of the reservations topic complicates the sce-
nario even more. Basically, the object and purpose rule is not as
"self-evident" as it may seem to be in principle. The fact is that there
are no clear guidelines for applying the object and purpose rule. It
demands an in-depth consideration that member states of the IASHR
are unwilling or unable to give it. It is unthinkable to ask states to
study the jurisprudence and advisory opinions of the Court, the gen-
eral and individual reports of the Commission, the evolution of doc-
trine in international human rights law, and the many other sources
that could put them in position to make informed decisions in this re-
gard. Unfortunately, the decision-making process does not always
make juridical coherence a priority in the implementation stage of
137. See supra note 2 (discussing the ongoing debate within O.A.S. about the
IASHR).
138. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 75.
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the treaties.
It is imperative to use the current legal mechanisms to call atten-
tion to this problem. The ideal would be for states to withdraw in-
compatible reservations, and for other potential parties to the Ameri-
can Convention to be aware that they should not formulate prohibited
or incompatible reservations. It does not appear that this is going to
happen motu proprio because States are not likely to change their
practice with regard to reservations.
As far as this study was able to determine, even the two special-
ized organs of the IASHR have not adequately addressed the issue.
The supervisory organs have not provided proper service to the
IAHRS with respect to reservations. The Court has issued some du-
bious pronouncements in the exercise of its advisory competence. As
for the Commission, when it had the opportunity to take responsibil-
ity, it just avoided the burden and requested an advisory opinion
from the Court.3 9 Had it acted otherwise, the history of the System
could have been different, and the System could have had its own ju-
risprudence similar, mutatis mutandis, to the European System."' It
is time to revisit the problem and to adapt it to the evolving field of
international human rights law.
For methodological reasons, in this paper, the test to determine the
validity of reservations was established in relation to Article 27 of
the American Convention, which lists the non-derogable rights."
Even such a simplistic approach yields a useful means of identifying
an objective test of the object and purpose rule. Bearing this basic
idea in mind, the supervisory organs of the System may play an im-
portant role in dealing with this issue.
General Comment No. 24 voiced by the Human Rights Committee
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights devel-
oped an argument that is applicable, inutatis inutandis, to the
IASHR. 142 The gist of the Comment, which can be extracted for the
139. The underlying origin of Advisory Opinion OC-3 83 was the ICHR search
for the Court's support in a case where Guatemala argued the lack of jurisdiction
of the ICHR by virtue of its reservation to Article 4 of the American Convention.
140. See supra note 55.
141. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, suwpra note 1, art. 27.
142. See supra note 9.
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purpose of this Article, is that treaties' own supervisory organs have
the competence to assess the validity of reservations, taking into ac-
count the object and purpose of the instruments. The rationale is that
the inherent, if not explicit, powers set forth in the conventions for
monitoring compliance with the obligations include such a compe-
tence. This, of course, has been contested by states that consider that
such an interpretation is without foundation and that, in the absence
of an express faculty contemplated in a particular convention, the
applicable law is the Vienna Convention. Hence, states feel that they
have the exclusive right to act in this respect, and that any other in-
terpretation is contrary to international law. '4
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is the first
body in the System that could be called upon to bring the issue to the
attention of states. The IACHR has a broad mandate that may be
used to efficiently protect the integrity of the System. Its main func-
tion is "to promote respect for and defense of human rights" and, to
that effect, it has the powers enunciated in Article 41 of the Conven-
tion."' Of particular relevance for the purpose of this Article are the
following provisions that, taken together, provide adequate remedies
against inconsistent reservations:
b. to make recommendations to the governments of the member states,
when it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive
measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic
law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to fur-
ther the observance of those rights;
c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the per-
formance of its duties; .... '
The substantial limitation to international protection provided by
the San Jose Pact directly harms the System itself and potentially de-
prives individuals of remedies that are subject to reservations. The
detrimental effect of incompatible reservations is an unquestionable
reality. Therefore, there is no reason to prevent the IACHR from
fully exercising its powers and addressing the issue of incompatible
143. See CHINKIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 193-203 (discussing the positions of
the United States and Great Britain with respect to General Comment No. 24).
144. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 41.
145. Id.
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reservations to the American Convention or any other instrument of
the IASHR. In the short term, the IACHR could issue a general rec-
ommendation that reserving states withdraw their reservations. Fur-
ther, it could develop a case-by-case study and, inter alia, include a
chapter on the subject in its annual report to the General Assembly of
the O.A.S.14 6 It is unjustifiable that these annual reports have never
directed attention to the topic. Arguably, there are many more sensi-
tive problems in the area of human rights, but that is not reason
enough to avoid the topic as if the question of reservations were
without significance. Certainly, an opinion of the IACHR would
have only a recommendatory effect, but it would be enough to cata-
lyze a substantive discussion on the issue.
The Inter-American Court's competence is more restricted. It
could address the issue of incompatible reservations in individual
cases submitted to its jurisdiction according to Article 62.3:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the in-
terpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are
submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or
have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant
to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement."
Unfortunately for the System, the Court has yet to decide a case in
which its jurisdiction has been contested on the grounds of formu-
lated reservations. This may change since, in the last annual report of
the IACHR, it is mentioned that a case has been submitted to the
Court and, given the background of the case, it is foreseeable that the
state in question may resort to its reservation to challenge the com-
petence of the Court.
4 1
Article 64.1 also gives any member of the O.A.S. the capacity to
request advisory opinions "regarding the interpretation of the
146. According to the Charter of the O.A.S. (Art. 9 1.1, the Permanent Council
should consider the reports of all the bodies and agencies of the Inter-American
System, including the ICHR, "and present to the General Assembly any observa-
tions and recommendations it deems necessary." See OAS CHARTER, supra note
48, at 60.
147. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 62.3.
148. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1999, Ch. III.D.2, paras. 81-89, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. LIV I1.106 Doc.3 (2000).
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[American Convention] or of the other treaties concerning the pro-
tection of human rights in the American states. '' States are wary of
taking positions on the issue of reservations, and it is not likely that a
state or group of states would be willing to exercise the right to re-
quest an advisory opinion regarding inconsistent reservations in gen-
eral, much less regarding particular reservations formulated by other
countries.
The second part of Article 64.1 confers the same right-the ca-
pacity to request an advisory opinion-on any of the organs listed in
Article 53 of the Charter of the Organization of American States.'""
However, it is unrealistic to expect that the General Assembly or the
Permanent Council-political organs of the O.A.S.-will petition the
Court to pronounce an opinion on the topic. The actions of these po-
litical organs do not represent a particular state's interest, but their
composition is governmental and, as noted above, the temperament
of states with regard to the issue demonstrates their aversion to con-
fronting the issue. In practice, an advisory opinion with that origin
would be the states' will, exercised through the political organs.
Given this state of affairs, the desired collective action is not likely to
occur, since the General Assembly or Permanent Council is not
likely to request an advisory opinion unless the sentiments of states
regarding reservations undergo a substantial change. The rationale
summarized above is also applicable to Article 64.2, which confers
upon a state party the right to request from the Court "opinions re-
garding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws" with the inter-
national instruments of human rights, and particularly with the San
Jose Pact. As stated above, that is not likely to happen.
What the aforementioned political organs could do without com-
promising their "neutrality" is ask the Inter-American Juridical
Committee12 to study the issue regarding reservations to human right
149. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art. 64. 1.
150. Article 64.1 of the American Convention refers to Chapter X of the Charter
of the O.A.S., but the instrument in force is the so-called Washington Protocol and
the pertinent Chapter that the Convention refers to is number VIII. See OAS
CHARTER, supra note 48, at 53.
151. See American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note I, art. 64.2.
152. See OAS CHARTER, supra note 48, at 62 (noting that "[tlhe purpose of the
Inter-American Committee is to serve the Organization as an advisory body on ju-
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treaties within the Inter-American System. As noted in Part I above,
the current regime for the whole Inter-American System is set forth
in General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 888 (XVII-O/87), which
has its origin precisely in the work undertaken by the Inter-American
Juridical Committee. Also, this is a regime based on the Vienna
Convention that therefore is not specific to human rights treaties.
While the Inter-American Juridical Committee is likely to approach
the issue similarly to the International Law Commission, the risk of
duplication would be worthwhile to increase the attention to the par-
ticular nature of human rights treaties and the necessity of revisiting
the reservation regime in that field.
The potential, as mentioned in the O.A.S. Charter, for organs to
request an advisory opinion from the Court regarding reservations to
human rights treaties is limited. Article 64.1 of the San Jose Pact re-
duces that possibility to the organs' "sphere of competence." In fact,
the advisory opinions of the Court up to now have been rendered
only at the request of states or the IACHR. The bottom line, how-
ever, is that, even if somehow an advisory opinion were requested,
the results would not be binding on the states.
The ideal scenario to effectively address the issue would be a re-
negotiation of Article 75 of the American Convention. The other in-
struments of the IASHR also contain different provisions that might
serve as a guide for improving the current regime of the San Jose
Pact. It is noteworthy that the other conventions of the System incor-
porate, with different wording, two elements that could improve the
American Convention regime: (a) compatibility with the object and
purpose of the Convention, and (b) specificity of the reservation."
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has already stated that
reservations to the San Jose Pact should respect the object and pur-
pose rule. The specificity of the reservation is the missing element in
the Convention that should be expressly incorporated into the re-
gime. The first step toward doing so would be to return to the origi-
nal language on reservations submitted to the Conference that nego-
tiated the Convention." The European Convention on Human
ridical matters [and] to promote the development and codification of international
lav").
153. See supra note 34.
154. See Acts and Documents, supra note 16.
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Rights, for instance, requires that the reservation be accompanied by
the legal provision that prevents the state from accepting the conven-
tional obligation. In the case of the American Convention, the provi-
sion to be attached to the reservation should be a constitutional dis-
position because Article 2 of the Convention, construed in
conjunction with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention,'" obliges
states parties "to adopt ... such legislative measures as may be nec-
essary to give effect to those rights or freedoms"' 116 set forth in the
Convention, meaning that conventional precepts prevail over internal
legal dispositions.
A new approach to reservations for a new Article 75 of the Ameri-
can Convention could be based on the following:
1. Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification, or acces-
sion, make reservations to this Convention provided that such reser-
vations:
are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion;
are not of a general nature, but instead are related to one or more
specific provisions that are not in conformity with the Constitution in
force in its territory; and
contain a statement of the constitutional proviso concerned.
2. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights shall determine, ex-
officio, whether the reservations formulated comply with the re-
quirements of this Article.
The idea is to consider not just the elements of object and purpose
of the Convention, and the specificity of the reservation, but to take
advantage of the existence of a judicial organ that should have the
capacity to determine whether a reservation is consistent with the
Convention. Other complementary options include a temporal limi-
tation of reservations and the necessity to expressly revise them from
time to time.'
57
155. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 27 (stating that "[a] party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to per-
form a treaty.").
156. American Convention, in Basic Documents, supra note 1, art 2.
157. See LIJNZAAD, supra note 10, at 422 (stating that "[r]eservations shall be
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Finally, as stated at the beginning of this paper, none of these ideas
are likely to succeed in the short term if states are reluctant to recog-
nize the evolving reality of international human rights law. More out
of personal optimism than realistic expectation. however, I foresee
the triumph of this reality over the barriers imposed by the apprehen-
sive principle of sovereignty, and consequently the achievement of
universality and integrity at the same time.
valid for the duration of (five) years.").
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